Does access to patent information help technological acquisitions? Evidence from patent library openings

57 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2022 Last revised: 20 Aug 2024

See all articles by Connie X. Mao

Connie X. Mao

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

Yueru Qin

Temple University - Department of Finance

Xuan Tian

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Chi Zhang

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Date Written: December 28, 2021

Abstract

Technology acquirers face significant information asymmetry when identifying appropriate acquisition targets. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the costs of gathering technological information as the result of patent library openings. We find that, after local patent libraries open, firms become more active in technological acquisitions, acquirers prefer targets that are geographically or technologically close to a lesser extent, completion rates for technology M&A increase, and performance improves. Post-merger innovation output is enhanced through more collaboration between inventors of acquirers and their targets. Overall, our study sheds new light on the importance of information-gathering costs in corporate takeovers and on the search for human capital synergies.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Patent and Trademark Depository Library, Patent Information, Information-Gathering Costs

JEL Classification: G34, O3, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Mao, Connie X. and Qin, Yueru and Tian, Xuan and Zhang, Chi, Does access to patent information help technological acquisitions? Evidence from patent library openings (December 28, 2021). PBCSF-NIFR Research Paper Forthcoming, Fox School of Business Research Paper Forthcoming, Accepted at Journal of Accounting Research, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3995489

Connie X. Mao

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

416 Alter Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-4895 (Phone)
215-204-1697 (Fax)

Yueru Qin

Temple University - Department of Finance ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

Xuan Tian

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance ( email )

No. 43, Chengfu Road
Haidian District
Beijing 100083
China
+86-10-62794103 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://xuantian.info/

Chi Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Lowell ( email )

Pulichino Tong Building
Manning School of Business
Lowell, MA 01854
United States

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