Reverse Revolving Doors in the Supervision of European Banks

41 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2022

See all articles by Stefano Colonnello

Stefano Colonnello

Ca Foscari University of Venice; Halle Institute for Economic Research

Michael Koetter

Halle Institute for Economic Research

Alex Sclip

University of Udine

Konstantin Wagner

Halle Institute for Economic Research

Date Written: April 26, 2021

Abstract

We show that the presence of executive directors with prior experience in the finance industry is pervasive on the boards of European national banking supervisors. Up to one executive out of three has previously held positions in the industry he/she supervises. Appointments of such executives impacts more favorably bank valuations than those of executives without a finance background. The proximity to supervised banks---rather than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills---appears to drive the positive differential effect of finance-related executives.

Keywords: Revolving Doors, Banking Supervision, Conflicts of Interest

JEL Classification: G14, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Colonnello, Stefano and Koetter, Michael and Sclip, Alex and Wagner, Konstantin, Reverse Revolving Doors in the Supervision of European Banks (April 26, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997731 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3997731

Stefano Colonnello (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, Veneto 30123
Italy

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

Michael Koetter

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.iwh-halle.de/en/about-the-iwh/people/detail/michael-koetter/

Alex Sclip

University of Udine ( email )

Italy

Konstantin Wagner

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

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