Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules

Abstract

AbstractAbstract We study a model of institutions that evolve through conflict. We find that one of three configurations can emerge: an extractive hegemony, a balance of power between extractive societies or a balance of power between inclusive societies - the latter being most conducive to innovation. As extractive societies are assumed to have an advantage in head to head confrontations we refer to this latter possibility as the survival of the weakest. Our contention is that the reason that the West “rules” can be traced back to two events both taking place in China: the invention of the cannon, which made possible the survival of the weakest in Europe; and the arrival of Genghis Khan, which led to the survival of the strongest in China. div.abstract { font-size: small; margin-top: 0.7ex; margin-bottom: 0.7ex; margin-left: 3ex; margin-right: 3ex; text-align: left; }span.abstract_label { font-weight: bold; font-size: large; text-align: center; }

Keywords: Game theory, Evolution, Balance of Power, Conflict, Innovation, Industrial Revolution