The Resilience of Private Authority in Times of Crisis

26 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2022

See all articles by Panos Delimatsis

Panos Delimatsis

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg Law School

Date Written: December 28, 2021

Abstract

From European integration to domestic politics to the development of the global economy, technocracy and private ordering have shaped economic behaviour. Such transformative private-driven forces of economic activity flourished through the promulgation of voluntary standards. In view of the ever-increasing powers that are transferred to private actors and their relative power as a de facto pillar of global regulatory making, it is surprising that their dominance remains largely unaffected by regulatory shocks that they partly cause. Rather, in practice, crises (broadly defined as disruptive disturbances) appear to empower such forces or generate new ones, whereas existing checks and balances fail their initial purpose. In emphasising the role of the innate traits, fabric of interactions and dynamics in times of crises within private rule-making bodies, the present article analyses the foundations for a new, evidence-based theory to explain the resilience of private collective action and establishes a research agenda.

Keywords: private regulation, standard-setting, resilience, regulatory disasters, crisis management, transnational rule-makers, free-riding, voluntary economic activism

JEL Classification: D02, D23, F02, F15, F23, F30, F51, F53, F65, F68, G01, G15, G18, G21, G28, G41, K22, L14, L51

Suggested Citation

Delimatsis, Panagiotis, The Resilience of Private Authority in Times of Crisis (December 28, 2021). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2021-017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4000437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4000437

Panagiotis Delimatsis (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/p-delimatsis

Tilburg Law School ( email )

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