Download This PaperNoncompete Agreements, Training, and Wage Competition
28 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2022
Date Written: January 4, 2022
Abstract
We study the effects of noncompete contracts in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare.
Keywords: Noncompete agreements, wage competition, on-the-job training, labor law
JEL Classification: J41, J31, K31, L4, M53
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Shy, Oz and Stenbacka, Rune, Noncompete Agreements, Training, and Wage Competition (January 4, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4000688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4000688
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