Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Intergenerational Responsibility

48 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2022

See all articles by Victor Klockmann

Victor Klockmann

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines

Alicia von Schenk

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS

Date Written: December 21, 2021

Abstract

In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Morality, Prosociality, Generations, Externalities

JEL Classification: C49, C91, D10, D62, D63, O33

Suggested Citation

Klockmann, Victor and von Schenk, Alicia and Villeval, Marie Claire, Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Intergenerational Responsibility (December 21, 2021). SAFE Working Paper No. 335, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002578 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4002578

Victor Klockmann

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, 97070
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines ( email )

Lentzeallee 94
Berlin, 14195
Germany

Alicia Von Schenk (Contact Author)

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, D-97070
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines ( email )

Berlin
Germany

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

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