Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Pivotality

50 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2022 Last revised: 22 Feb 2023

See all articles by Victor Klockmann

Victor Klockmann

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines

Alicia von Schenk

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 22, 2022

Abstract

With Big Data, decisions made by machine learning algorithms depend on training data generated by many individuals. In the ethical domain, how does this feature affect the prosociality of the decisions that serve to train the AI? In an experiment in which we manipulated the pivotality of individual human decisions used to train an artificially intelligent algorithm, we show how the diffusion of responsibility weakened revealed social preferences and led to the design of algorithmic models favoring selfish decisions. This does not result from a change in the structure of incentives, and it is independent from the existence of externalities. Rather, our results show that Big Data offers an excuse for selfish behavior through lower responsibility for one’s and others’ fate.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, Pivotality, Ethics, Experiment

JEL Classification: C49, C91, D10, D63, D64, O33

Suggested Citation

Klockmann, Victor and von Schenk, Alicia and Villeval, Marie Claire, Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Pivotality (February 22, 2022). SAFE Working Paper No. 336, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4003065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4003065

Victor Klockmann (Contact Author)

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, 97070
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines ( email )

Lentzeallee 94
Berlin, 14195
Germany

Alicia Von Schenk

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, D-97070
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Center for Humans and Machines ( email )

Berlin
Germany

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

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