Negotiator Preference Change: Motivational vs. Informational Mechanisms for Dynamic Valuation

13 Pages Posted: 16 May 2003

See all articles by Corinne Bendersky

Corinne Bendersky

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Human Resources & Organizational Behavior (HROB) Area

Jared R. Curhan

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

Results from previous research suggest that individuals change their preferences during negotiations (J. R. Curhan, M. A. Neale, & L. Ross, forthcoming). Consistent with dissonance and self-perception theories, negotiators enhance their valuation of offers they make. Consistent with reactance theory and rational inference, negotiators devalue offers they receive. Each of these dynamic valuation processes could be explained by informational mechanisms alone, or additionally by motivational mechanisms. The present investigation examines negotiator preference change in a context where informational mechanisms can be controlled for, and hence motivational mechanisms could be measured independently. Results of this investigation will potentially have important implications for theory and practice.

Keywords: Negotiation, Preference Changes, Self-perception, Dissonance, Reactance, Reactive Devaluation

Suggested Citation

Bendersky, Corinne and Curhan, Jared R., Negotiator Preference Change: Motivational vs. Informational Mechanisms for Dynamic Valuation (April 2003). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4306-03; 16th Annual IACM Conference Melbourne, Australia. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=400600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.400600

Corinne Bendersky (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Human Resources & Organizational Behavior (HROB) Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

Jared R. Curhan

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

50 Memorial Drive, E52-554
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-5219 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)

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