Information Bundling and Capital Market Feedback: Evidence from Patent Tuesdays

58 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2022 Last revised: 6 Aug 2023

See all articles by Mustafa Ahci

Mustafa Ahci

Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Tim Martens

Bocconi University - Department of Accounting

Christoph J. Sextroh

Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Date Written: August 4, 2023

Abstract

We examine whether bundling the release of information affects managers' ability to gather decision-relevant information from market prices. Using the plausibly exogenous timing of patent grant disclosures by the United States Patent and Trademark Office as a source of variation in the simultaneous release of firm-specific value-relevant information, we show that the market's response to patent grants is more informative for managerial decisions if the firm receives fewer patent grants on the same day. This effect is more pronounced for patents that relate to relatively more exploratory innovative strategies for which feedback is arguably more important. Firms with more distinct information releases also produce more valuable and higher quality innovations in the future. Taken together, our results suggest that bundling the release of multiple pieces of information at once potentially impedes managers' ability to benefit from the market's feedback.

Keywords: Information bundling, Information release, Patent disclosure, Patent grant, Capital market feedback, Corporate innovation, Corporate investment, Managerial learning

JEL Classification: D83, G14, M40, O30

Suggested Citation

Ahci, Mustafa and Martens, Tim and Sextroh, Christoph J., Information Bundling and Capital Market Feedback: Evidence from Patent Tuesdays (August 4, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4009199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4009199

Mustafa Ahci

Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tim Martens

Bocconi University - Department of Accounting ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Christoph J. Sextroh (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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