How Does Group-Decision Making Affect Subsequent Individual Behavior?

46 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2022

See all articles by Philipp Dörrenberg

Philipp Dörrenberg

University of Mannheim; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Christoph Feldhaus

Ruhr University of Bochum

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

Do groups and individuals behave differently in dictator games with varying deservingness of the recipient? Does the involvement in group-decision making affect the decisions of group members in subsequent individual decisions? We address these questions using a controlled dictator-game experiment and find the following main results. First, groups and individuals are not different w.r.t. their dictator-game decisions and recipient deservingness does not have a different effect on groups than on individuals. Second, participants who were previously part of a group decision process are more generous in a subsequent individual-level decision than participants who previously made individual decisions. We exploit the chat protocols of group discussions to shed light on the mechanism behind this result. Consistent with moral balancing, we show that the effect of group-decision making on subsequent individual decisions is driven by subjects who intent to make good for the initial group decision.

Keywords: group-decision making, dictator game, recipient deservingness, moral balancing

JEL Classification: C910, C920, D910

Suggested Citation

Dörrenberg, Philipp and Feldhaus, Christoph, How Does Group-Decision Making Affect Subsequent Individual Behavior? (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9513, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4009413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4009413

Philipp Dörrenberg (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

L 7, 3-5
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Christoph Feldhaus

Ruhr University of Bochum

Universitätsstraße 150
Bochum, NRW 44780
Germany

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