Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence

67 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2022

See all articles by Yiming Cao

Yiming Cao

Boston University

Benjamin Enke

Harvard University

Armin Falk

University of Bonn

Paola Giuliano

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Nathan Nunn

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

According to the widely known ‘culture of honor’ hypothesis from social psychology, traditional herding practices have generated a value system conducive to revenge-taking and violence. We test the economic significance of this idea at a global scale using a combination of ethnographic and folklore data, global information on conflicts, and multinational surveys. We find that the descendants of herders have significantly more frequent and severe conflict today, and report being more willing to take revenge in global surveys. We conclude that herding practices generated a functional psychology that plays a role in shaping conflict across the globe.

Suggested Citation

Cao, Yiming and Enke, Benjamin and Falk, Armin and Giuliano, Paola and Nunn, Nathan, Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9519, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4009419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4009419

Yiming Cao (Contact Author)

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Benjamin Enke

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Armin Falk

University of Bonn

Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Paola Giuliano

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Nathan Nunn

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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