Grand Corruption in the Contracting Out of Public Services: Lessons from a Pilot Study in Colombia

38 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2022

See all articles by Philip Keefer

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank

Benjamin Roseth

Inter-American Development Bank

Date Written: January 16, 2022

Abstract

We find evidence that transparency interventions can reduce corrupt behavior in circumstances which theory predicts are least favorable to them and that are often associated with “grand corruption”: when corrupt actors are few and politically influential; their behavior imposes small costs on many; and it is difficult to observe. These conditions characterize the Colombian School Meals Program. Nevertheless, informal audits and text messages to parents appear to curb corruption in the provision of school meals. The study yields detailed information about how actors respond to the intervention and the substantial methodological challenges the response creates, especially large spillover effects from treated to control groups. Additional evidence begins to disentangle mechanisms. Parental mobilization increased after the intervention but some effects are best explained by operator concern that systematic evidence of corrupt behavior would trigger enforcement actions by high-level enforcement agencies outside of the political jurisdictions where they are most influential.

Keywords: corruption, information, transparency, audits, contracting out

JEL Classification: D73, H4, H42

Suggested Citation

Keefer, Philip and Roseth, Benjamin, Grand Corruption in the Contracting Out of Public Services: Lessons from a Pilot Study in Colombia (January 16, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4010237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4010237

Philip Keefer (Contact Author)

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
202-623-1961 (Phone)

Benjamin Roseth

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Av NW
Washington, DC
United States

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