The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

80 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2022 Last revised: 30 Mar 2023

See all articles by Filippo Lancieri

Filippo Lancieri

Georgetown University Law Center; ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics; Stigler Center

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: March 20, 2023

Abstract

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes.

Keywords: Antitrust, enforcement, political economy, regulatory capture

JEL Classification: K21, L40, P16

Suggested Citation

Lancieri, Filippo and Posner, Eric A. and Zingales, Luigi, The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States (March 20, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4011335 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011335

Filippo Lancieri (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics ( email )

ETH-Zentrum SEW E 26
CH-8092 Zurich, Zurich 8006
Switzerland

Stigler Center ( email )

Walker Hall
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

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773-702-0425 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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