Welfare Effects of R&D Support Policies

70 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2022 Last revised: 11 Nov 2022

See all articles by Tuomas Takalo

Tuomas Takalo

Bank of Finland

Tanja Tanayama

European Union - European Investment Bank

Otto Toivanen

Aalto University - Department of Economics; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE); CEPR; Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER)

Date Written: January 18, 2022

Abstract

We conduct a welfare analysis of R&D subsidies and tax credits using a model of innovation policy incorporating externalities, limited R&D participation and financial market imperfections. We estimate the model using R&D project level data from Finland. The intensive, not the extensive R&D margin is important. Financial frictions do not matter much. Tax credits and subsidies do not reach first best but increase R&D 30-50% compared to laissez-faire. Once the subsidy application costs are accounted for, tax credits increase welfare by 1% and subsidies slightly reduce welfare. In terms of fiscal cost, tax credits are 90% more expensive than R&D subsidies.

Keywords: R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, extensive and intensive margin, financial market imperfections, welfare, counterfactual, economic growth

Suggested Citation

Takalo, Tuomas and Tanayama, Tanja and Toivanen, Otto, Welfare Effects of R&D Support Policies (January 18, 2022). Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 2/2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4012386

Tuomas Takalo (Contact Author)

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

Tanja Tanayama

European Union - European Investment Bank ( email )

98-100 Boulevard Konrad Adenauer
L-2950
Luxembourg

Otto Toivanen

Aalto University - Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 1210
FI-00101 Helsinki
Finland

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER)

FI-00014 Helsinki
Finland

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