Race and the Mismeasure of School Quality

35 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2022 Last revised: 26 May 2025

See all articles by Joshua D. Angrist

Joshua D. Angrist

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Peter Hull

Brown University

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Christopher Walters

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2021

Abstract

In large urban districts, schools enrolling more white students tend to have higher performance ratings. We use an instrumental variables strategy leveraging centralized school assignment to explore this relationship. Estimates from Denver and New York City suggest the correlation between school performance ratings and white enrollment shares reflects selection bias rather than causal school value-added. In fact, value-added in these two cities is essentially unrelated to white enrollment shares. A simple regression adjustment is shown to yield school ratings that are uncorrelated with race, while predicting value-added as well or better than the corresponding unadjusted measures.

Suggested Citation

Angrist, Joshua and Hull, Peter and Pathak, Parag A. and Walters, Christopher, Race and the Mismeasure of School Quality (December 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29608, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4012522

Joshua Angrist (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Peter Hull

Brown University ( email )

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Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Christopher Walters

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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