The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana

Abstract

Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.

These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response to the strategy of 'always cooperate' is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the strategy of 'always cooperate' is cooperating with the other player through each round of the game. The game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best - and thus as better than an attack on a defenseless neighbor that would lead to an immediate victory.

Keywords: Game theory, international relations, peace and war, credibility, incentives

JEL Classification: K