Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution

52 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2022

See all articles by Johanna Mollerstrom

Johanna Mollerstrom

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Avner Strulov-Shlain

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Dmitry Taubinsky

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 27, 2022

Abstract

We report the results of an online experiment studying preferences for giving and preferences for group-wide redistribution in small (4-person) and large (200-person) groups. We find that the desire to engage in voluntary giving decreases significantly with group size. However, voting for group-wide redistribution is precisely estimated to not depend on group size. Moreover, people’s perception of the size of their reference group is malleable, and affects their desire to give. These results suggest that government programs, such as progressive tax-and-transfer systems, can help satisfy other-regarding preferences for redistribution in a way that creating opportunities for voluntary giving cannot.

Keywords: individual giving, group-wide redistribution, redistributive mechanisms

JEL Classification: D63, D9

Suggested Citation

Mollerstrom, Johanna and Strulov-Shlain, Avner and Taubinsky, Dmitry, Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution (January 27, 2022). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4019673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4019673

Johanna Mollerstrom (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/johannamollerstrom/

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Avner Strulov-Shlain

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Dmitry Taubinsky

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
66
Abstract Views
399
Rank
725,823
PlumX Metrics