An Experimental Study of Effects of Exitability and Correctibility on Electronic Negotiation

8 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2003

See all articles by Taketoshi Hatta

Taketoshi Hatta

Gifu University of Medical Science

Ken-ichi Ohbuchi

Tohoku University

Mitsutera Fukuno

Tohoku University

Abstract

The purpose of present study was to examine the effects of two features of electronic negotiation, correctability and exitability, on negotiation processes and outcomes in laboratory experiment. Correctability is to revise massages in advance to sending them to the other party. It was assumed to prompt informational and social elaborations. The possibility to exit (exitability) of the other party is psychological factor that causes one to perceive the negotiation as unstable. In two Experiments, Exitability of the other party was manipulated by three conditions (the one-limited, exitable and unexitable conditions) and Correctability was manipulated by two conditions (the correctable condition and the uncorrectable condition). Exitability caused by alternative partner prompted participants to offer the low level of demand and to reach agreement. Correctability produced messages that were clear and included trade-off, thus led agreements and contributed integrative agreement.

Keywords: Electronic negotiation, Exitability, Correctability

Suggested Citation

Hatta, Taketoshi and Ohbuchi, Ken-ichi and Fukuno, Mitsutera, An Experimental Study of Effects of Exitability and Correctibility on Electronic Negotiation. 16th Annual IACM Conference Melbourne, Australia. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=402022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.402022

Taketoshi Hatta (Contact Author)

Gifu University of Medical Science ( email )

SKK Building, Katahira 2
795-1 Nagamine Ichihiraga,Seki, Gifu 501-3892
Japan

Ken-ichi Ohbuchi

Tohoku University ( email )

SKK Building, Katahira 2
Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi 980-8577
Japan

Mitsutera Fukuno

Tohoku University ( email )

SKK Building, Katahira 2
Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi 980-8577
Japan

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