Do Firms Walk the Climate Talk?

48 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2022 Last revised: 4 Nov 2022

See all articles by Michał Dzieliński

Michał Dzieliński

Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University

Florian Eugster

University of St. Gallen - Institute of Accounting, Control and Auditing; Swiss Finance Institute

Emma Sjöström

Stockholm School of Economics

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

Date Written: November 4, 2022

Abstract

Firms talk more about the climate on earnings conference calls when climate matters are more material for a firm, when there is greater shareholder pressure or when it is better prepared for climate-related disclosure. However, there is also large unexplained variation in climate talk. In a global sample, we find that climate talk is negatively related to the change in CO2 emissions in the years after the call. However, this does not hold in the US, individualistic cultures and cultures characterized by short-term horizons. In those settings, investors also react negatively to climate talk. Overall, these results suggest that firms walk the climate talk on average, but the credibility of such talk varies across firms.

Keywords: climate talk, earnings calls, sustainability, CO2 emissions, greenwashing

JEL Classification: D83, G14, G34, G41, Q54

Suggested Citation

Dzieliński, Michał and Eugster, Florian and Sjöström, Emma and Wagner, Alexander F., Do Firms Walk the Climate Talk? (November 4, 2022). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 22-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4021061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4021061

Michał Dzieliński (Contact Author)

Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University ( email )

Kräftriket 7
Stockholm, 106 91
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbs.su.se/en/

Florian Eugster

University of St. Gallen - Institute of Accounting, Control and Auditing ( email )

St.Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Emma Sjöström

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zürich, 8032
Switzerland
+41 44 634 3963 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.alex-wagner.com

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