Download This PaperDeferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information
20 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2022 Last revised: 11 Feb 2022
Date Written: February 3, 2022
Abstract
This paper studies a matching algorithm which is termed incomplete-information deferred acceptance (DA). We show that DA is finite and that it produces a stable market state. We also compare DA with algorithms in the literature, including the complete-information Gale-Shapley algorithm, the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm and learning-blocking paths.
Keywords: two-sided matching, incomplete information, deferred acceptance.
JEL Classification: C78, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chen, Yi-Chun and Hu, Gaoji, Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information (February 3, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4024839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024839
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