Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information

20 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2022 Last revised: 11 Feb 2022

See all articles by Yi-Chun Chen

Yi-Chun Chen

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics

Gaoji Hu

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Date Written: February 3, 2022

Abstract

This paper studies a matching algorithm which is termed incomplete-information deferred acceptance (DA). We show that DA is finite and that it produces a stable market state. We also compare DA with algorithms in the literature, including the complete-information Gale-Shapley algorithm, the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm and learning-blocking paths.

Keywords: two-sided matching, incomplete information, deferred acceptance.

JEL Classification: C78, D83

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yi-Chun and Hu, Gaoji, Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information (February 3, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4024839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024839

Yi-Chun Chen

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )

1 Arts Link AS2 #06-02
Singapore 117570, Singapore 119077
Singapore

Gaoji Hu (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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