The Premia on State-Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments

48 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2022 Last revised: 18 Feb 2022

See all articles by Deniz Igan

Deniz Igan

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Financial Studies Division

Taehoon Kim

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Antoine Levy

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: December 1, 2021

Abstract

State-contingent debt instruments such as GDP-linked warrants have garnered attention as a potential tool to help debt-stressed economies smooth repayments over business cycles, yet very few studies of the empirical properties of these instruments exist. This paper develops a general f ramework to estimate the time-varying risk premium of a state-contingent sovereign debt instrument. Our estimation framework applied to GDP-linked warrants issued by Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine reveals three stylized facts: (i) the risk premium in state-contingent instruments is high and persistent; (ii) the risk premium exhibits a pro-cyclical pattern; and (iii) the liquidity premium is higher and more volatile than that for plain-vanilla government bonds issued by the same sovereign. We then present a model in which investors fear ambiguity and that can account for the cyclical properties of the risk premium.

Keywords: State-contingent debt instruments, GDP-linked warrants, Risk premia, Procyclicality

JEL Classification: H63, G13, E44

Suggested Citation

Igan, Deniz and Kim, Taehoon and Levy, Antoine, The Premia on State-Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments (December 1, 2021). IMF Working Paper No. 2021/282, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4026512

Deniz Igan (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Financial Studies Division ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Taehoon Kim

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Antoine Levy

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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