The Unattractiveness of Indeterminate Dynamic Equilibria

28 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2022

See all articles by Julian Ashwin

Julian Ashwin

University of Oxford; European Central Bank (ECB)

Paul Beaudry

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Vancouver School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Martin Ellison

University of Oxford

Date Written: December 2021

Abstract

Macroeconomic forces that generate multiple equilibria often support locally-indeterminate dynamic equilibria in which a continuum of perfect foresight paths converge towards the same steady state. The set of rational expectations equilibria (REE) in such environments can be very large, although the relevance of many of them has been questioned on the basis that they may not be learnable. In this paper we document the existence of a learnable REE in such situations. However, we show that the dynamics of this learnable REE do not resemble perturbations around any of the convergent perfect foresight paths. Instead, the learnable REE treats the locally-indeterminate steady state as unstable, in contrast to it resembling a stable attractor under perfect foresight.

Keywords: Indeterminacy, Machine Learning, multiple equilibria, neural networks

Suggested Citation

Ashwin, Julian and Beaudry, Paul and Ellison, Martin, The Unattractiveness of Indeterminate Dynamic Equilibria (December 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16822, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4026690

Julian Ashwin (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

European Central Bank (ECB)

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Paul Beaudry

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Vancouver School of Economics ( email )

997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z1
Canada

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Martin Ellison

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

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