Organized Information Transmission

61 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2022

See all articles by Laurent Mathevet

Laurent Mathevet

European University Institute

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh

Date Written: January 1, 2022


We formalize the concepts of horizontal and vertical information transmission and introduce two families of information structures, namely single-meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that specialize along these dimensions. We characterize the strategic outcomes that they implement in general finite incomplete information games and illustrate the resulting linear programming approach in a linear network example. We build on the characterizations to show that these families are unconstrained-optimal in binary-action games with strategic complementarities. Finally, we generalize these families to multiple meetings and random hierarchies and characterize the corresponding strategic outcomes.

Keywords: Bayes correlated equilibrium, delegated transmission, incomplete information, information design

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Mathevet, Laurent and Taneva, Ina, Organized Information Transmission (January 1, 2022). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16959, Available at SSRN:

Laurent Mathevet (Contact Author)

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

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