What Drives U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior?

58 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2022

Date Written: January 1, 2022

Abstract

Do U.S. corporate elites contribute to political campaigns purely motivated by ideological considerations – as typically assumed by the literature on individual donors’ drivers of contributions – or are their donations also a tool of political influence? I investigate this question using a new panel on the contributions to members of U.S. Congress (MCs) by 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over the 1999-2018 period. I show that donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. The estimates suggest that (i) 13% of the observed gap in corporate leaders’ donations to policy relevant versus other MCs is driven by an influence-seeking motive, and (ii) the total corporate leaders’ donations that are driven by the influence-seeking motive are about 53% of the overall donations by their companies’ PACs to all MCs over the same period.

Keywords: Campaign finance, Lobbying, U.S. Congress

JEL Classification: D72, G38

Suggested Citation

Teso, Edoardo, What Drives U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior? (January 1, 2022). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16966, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4026872

Edoardo Teso (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
195
PlumX Metrics