Financial Transparency, Labor Productivity, and Real Wages

46 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2022 Last revised: 19 Apr 2023

See all articles by Nargess Golshan

Nargess Golshan

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting

Inder K. Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business

Felipe Bastos G. Silva

University of Missouri, Columbia

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Date Written: April 19, 2023

Abstract

Financial transparency can affect labor markets directly by mitigating information asymmetries and optimizing the matching of heterogeneous firms and employees (matching efficiency channel) and indirectly through the effect of transparency on firms’ capital inputs (capital utilization channel). Exploiting the increase in financial transparency following the mandatory IFRS adoption by European Union countries, we perform a battery of tests that indicate subsequent increases in labor productivity and real wages for manufacturing industries in member countries. More importantly, we find evidence that both channels are economically relevant in explaining gains in labor productivity and real wages following the mandatory IFRS adoption. Collectively, our results underscore that the benefits of an increase in transparency go beyond the effects on capital markets and corporate investments, with implications for the allocation of human resources across corporations.

Keywords: International labor markets, IFRS International financial transparency, European Union

Suggested Citation

Golshan, Nargess and Khurana, Inder and Silva, Felipe Bastos G., Financial Transparency, Labor Productivity, and Real Wages (April 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4028993 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4028993

Nargess Golshan

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting ( email )

1309 E. 10th Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Inder Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business ( email )

331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-3474 (Phone)
573-882-2437 (Fax)

Felipe Bastos G. Silva (Contact Author)

University of Missouri, Columbia ( email )

331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
5738829905 (Phone)

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