The Determinants of Director Remuneration, Executive Tenure and Individual Executive Disclosure in North African IPO Firms

Research in International Business and Finance, 27(1): 162-182, 2013

30 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2022

See all articles by Bruce Allen Hearn

Bruce Allen Hearn

University of Southampton; University of Bradford - School of Management

Date Written: February 8, 2013

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.

Keywords: IPO; Board of Directors; remuneration; institutional theory; North Africa; MENA

Suggested Citation

Hearn, Bruce Allen, The Determinants of Director Remuneration, Executive Tenure and Individual Executive Disclosure in North African IPO Firms (February 8, 2013). Research in International Business and Finance, 27(1): 162-182, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4030110

Bruce Allen Hearn (Contact Author)

University of Southampton ( email )

University Rd.
Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hampshire SO17 1LP
United Kingdom

University of Bradford - School of Management ( email )

Emm Lane
Bradford, West Yorkshire Bd9 4JL
United Kingdom

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