Scaling versus Selling Startups: The Role of Foreign Acquirers in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems

60 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2022 Last revised: 25 Feb 2022

See all articles by Thomas F. Hellmann

Thomas F. Hellmann

University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Initiative

Veikko Thiele

Queen's University - Smith School of Business

Date Written: February 23, 2022

Abstract

This paper analyzes the decision of growing startups to either scale up on their own or to sell to an established company. The model recognizes the intergenerational linkages that acquirers were startups themselves in the past who chose not to get acquired. The acquisition price depends on the demand from those established acquirers, as well as the willingness of startups to sell instead of scale themselves. The model shows that in a closed economy, the number of scaleups is efficient. In an open economy, foreign buyers increase demand and raise acquisition prices. This stimulates startup formation but also encourages too many growing startups to sell instead of scale. In a dynamic equilibrium without externalities, foreign acquirers are a net benefit to the domestic ecosystem. However, two model extensions identify conditions under which they can weaken it, namely (i) when there are intergenerational externalities in the accumulation of scaleup experience, and (ii) when there is significant brain drain of serial entrepreneurs.

Keywords: Startups, scaleup, acquisitions, serial entrepreneurs, brain drain

JEL Classification: L26, M13

Suggested Citation

Hellmann, Thomas F. and Thiele, Veikko, Scaling versus Selling Startups: The Role of Foreign Acquirers in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems (February 23, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4033748

Thomas F. Hellmann

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0)1865 288937 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/community/people/thomas-hellmann

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0)1865 288937 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/community/people/thomas-hellmann

European Corporate Governance Initiative ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Veikko Thiele (Contact Author)

Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )

Goodes Hall
143 Union Street
Kingston, ON K7L 3N6
Canada
+1 613 533-2783 (Phone)
+1 613-533-6589 (Fax)

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