Global Corruption and the Courts: Ending the FCPA Free-Riding

Paul, John (2022) 'Global Corruption and the Courts: Ending the FCPA Free-Riding,' North East Journal of Legal Studies 42(1): 1-23. Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol42/iss1/1

24 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2022

See all articles by John Paul

John Paul

City University of New York - Brooklyn College

Date Written: August 16, 2021

Abstract

For two decades, the global community has agreed that nations must combat foreign bribery. But dramatic differences exist in foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions even among nations that have signed the OECD Convention. Many have claimed that the U.S. is too broad when it comes to investigating and prosecuting corruption abroad while other nations are too passive when combating corruption within their own borders.

Enforcement of anti-bribery laws aimed at global corruption remains in infancy outside the U.S. with the notable exception of Germany. Many nations are afraid of losing business opportunities as a result of implementing the FCPA so they are reluctant to investigate and prosecute bribery cases in their own jurisdictions. While there is evidence that initiatives under the OECD Convention are becoming more effective in deterring corruption by signatory nations, more needs to be done.

Inevitably, multi-national cooperation and coordination will be vital to global bribery in the future. There must be a global harmonization of the existing mechanisms that are used to investigate and prosecute corruption. Eradicating bribery and the free-rider problem, which cause the harmful distortion of global markets, is a vital step in creating a less corrupt international business environment.

Suggested Citation

Paul, John, Global Corruption and the Courts: Ending the FCPA Free-Riding (August 16, 2021). Paul, John (2022) 'Global Corruption and the Courts: Ending the FCPA Free-Riding,' North East Journal of Legal Studies 42(1): 1-23. Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol42/iss1/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036182

John Paul (Contact Author)

City University of New York - Brooklyn College ( email )

2900 Bedford Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11210
United States

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