Constitutional Metaphors: Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ and the Legitimation of Platform Governance

25 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2022

See all articles by Josh Cowls

Josh Cowls

University of Oxford - Oxford Internet Institute

Philipp Darius

Hertie School - Centre for Digital Governance

Dominiquo Santistevan

University of Chicago - Department of Sociology

Moritz Schramm

New York University; Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Date Written: February 16, 2022

Abstract

Who governs—and who should govern—online communication? Social media companies, international organizations, users, or the state? And by what means? A range of rhetorical devices have been used to simplify the complexities associated with the governance of online platforms. This includes ‘constitutional metaphors’: metaphorical allusions to traditional political concepts such as statehood, democracy, and constitutionalism. Here we empirically trace the ascent of a powerful constitutional metaphor currently employed in the news media discourse on platform governance: characterizations of Facebook’s Oversight Board (OB) as a ‘supreme court’. We investigate the metaphor’s descriptive suitability and question its normative and political ramifications. We argue that uncritical characterizations of the OB as Facebook’s ‘supreme court’ obscure its true scope and purpose. Additionally, we argue that appropriating the socio-cultural symbolism and hence political legitimacy of a supreme court, and mapping it onto a different type of actor, poses a threat to responsible platform governance.

Keywords: constitutional metaphors, content analysis, digital constitutionalism, Facebook, freedom of speech, legitimacy, metaphor, Oversight Board, platform governance, supreme court

Suggested Citation

Cowls, Josh and Darius, Philipp and Santistevan, Dominiquo and Schramm, Moritz, Constitutional Metaphors: Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ and the Legitimation of Platform Governance (February 16, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4036504

Josh Cowls (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Oxford Internet Institute ( email )

1 St. Giles
University of Oxford
Oxford OX1 3PG Oxfordshire, Oxfordshire OX1 3JS
United Kingdom

Philipp Darius

Hertie School - Centre for Digital Governance ( email )

Friedrichstr. 180
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Dominiquo Santistevan

University of Chicago - Department of Sociology ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Moritz Schramm

New York University ( email )

New York City

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin ( email )

Humboldt Universität
Unter den Linden 6
Berlin, 10099
Germany

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