Infinite Population Utilitarian Criteria

47 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2022

See all articles by Geir B. Asheim

Geir B. Asheim

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kohei Kamaga

Faculty of Economics, Sophia University

Stéphane Zuber

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES)

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

We examine utilitarian criteria for evaluating profiles of wellbeing among infinitely many individuals. Motivated by the non-existence of a natural 1-to-1 correspondence between people when alternatives have different population structures, with a different number of people in each generation, we impose equal treatment in the form of Strong Anonymity. We show how a novel criterion, Strongly Anonymous Utilitarianism, can be characterized by combining Strong Anonymity with other regularity axioms (Monotonicity, Finite Completeness, and continuity axioms) as well as axioms of equity, sensitivity, separability, and population ethics. We relate it to other strongly anonymous utilitarian criteria and demonstrate its applicability by showing how it leads to an efficient and sustainable stream in the Ramsey model.

Keywords: utilitarianism, intergenerational equity, population ethics

JEL Classification: D630, D710, Q010

Suggested Citation

Asheim, Geir B. and Kamaga, Kohei and Zuber, Stéphane, Infinite Population Utilitarian Criteria (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9576, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036993 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4036993

Geir B. Asheim (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47-2285 5498 (Phone)
+47-2285 5035 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Kohei Kamaga

Faculty of Economics, Sophia University ( email )

7-1, Kioi-cho
Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 1028554
Japan

Stéphane Zuber

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'hopital
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

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