Interactions across Multiple Games: Cooperation, Corruption, and Organizational Design

23 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2022 Last revised: 23 Oct 2022

See all articles by Jonathan Bendor

Jonathan Bendor

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Lukas Bolte

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Date Written: February 19, 2022

Abstract

Teams face a variety of strategic situations. It is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in productive but not in corrupt ones. However, cooperation in one situation may depend on expectations of cooperation in others. We identify when it is that sustaining socially desirable cooperation necessitates undesirable cooperation. We characterize how cooperation is shaped by the absolute and relative payoffs to cooperation across various tasks, as well as the frequency with which people are reshuffled across teams and whether teams can be specialized in the tasks they face.

Keywords: Teams, Organizational Design, Corruption, Cooperation, Police, Bureaucracy, Muli-Games

JEL Classification: C73, D23, D73, L20

Suggested Citation

Bendor, Jonathan and Bolte, Lukas and Immorlica, Nicole and Jackson, Matthew O., Interactions across Multiple Games: Cooperation, Corruption, and Organizational Design (February 19, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038899 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4038899

Jonathan Bendor

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
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Lukas Bolte

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
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STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02142
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Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

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Santa Fe, NM 87501
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