Interactions across Multiple Games: Cooperation, Corruption, and Organizational Design

34 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2022 Last revised: 17 Aug 2022

See all articles by Jonathan Bendor

Jonathan Bendor

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Lukas Bolte

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Date Written: February 19, 2022

Abstract

Teams face a variety of strategic circumstances, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in productive but not in corrupt ones. Understanding the behavior and social impact of teams requires understanding how cooperation in one situation depends on expectations of cooperation in others. We examine how the assignment of people to teams, and teams to tasks, affects cooperation among team members. We characterize the interdependency of cooperation across situations and show that in some settings, it may be impossible to get desirable types of cooperation without also getting undesirable cooperation. We show how cooperation in such interdependent settings is affected in nuanced ways by changes in the payoffs to cooperation and the temptations to deviate. This has novel implications for performance bonuses, occupational safety, and whistle-blowing rewards. The optimal organizational design involves minimizing corruption by some reshuffling of team members and specializing of the tasks to which different teams are assigned. We also analyze how technological advances change optimal team structure. Throughout, we discuss the implications for organizing bureaucracies, such as police forces and militaries, as well as private enterprises.

Keywords: Teams, Organizational Design, Corruption, Cooperation, Police, Bureaucracy, Muli-Games

JEL Classification: C73, D23, D73, L20

Suggested Citation

Bendor, Jonathan and Bolte, Lukas and Immorlica, Nicole and Jackson, Matthew O., Interactions across Multiple Games: Cooperation, Corruption, and Organizational Design (February 19, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038899 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4038899

Jonathan Bendor

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Lukas Bolte

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research ( email )

One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
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Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
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Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

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Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

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