Double Auctions and Walrasian Equilibrium

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 404

28 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2022 Last revised: 21 Mar 2023

See all articles by Simon Jantschgi

Simon Jantschgi

University of Zurich

Heinrich H. Nax

ETH Zürich; University of Zurich

Bary Pradelski

CNRS, Université Grenoble Alpes

Marek Pycia

University of Zurich

Date Written: February 11, 2022

Abstract

We define a double auction mechanism, treating in a unified way finite and infinite markets, allowing for ties in reported values, and not imposing any regularity assumptions. It is the first such definition. In all markets, our Double Auction implements market clearing and a
Walrasian equilibrium. In finite markets our Double Auction nests as special cases the standard k-Double Auction and in infinite markets the textbook model of continuous and strictly monotone demand and supply. Finally, we establish the convergence of finite to infinite Double Auctions.

Keywords: Double Auction, Market Clearing, Walrasian Equilibrium, Finite and Infinite Markets, Convergence

JEL Classification: D44, D47, D50

Suggested Citation

Jantschgi, Simon and Nax, Heinrich H. and Pradelski, Bary and Pycia, Marek, Double Auctions and Walrasian Equilibrium (February 11, 2022). University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 404, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4043532

Simon Jantschgi (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Zurich, -Select- 8050
Switzerland
8006 (Fax)

Heinrich H. Nax

ETH Zürich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Bary Pradelski

CNRS, Université Grenoble Alpes ( email )

Grenoble
France

HOME PAGE: http://cnrs.fr

Marek Pycia

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

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