Transcending Borders: Political Dynamics or Bureaucratic Independence in EU Budget Allocation

Abstract

Despite ongoing debates about reforming the European Commission’s political nature, little is known about its actual level of politicization. This paper investigates the effects of political distance between European Commissioners and heads of government on the allocation of EU funds to member states, offering a novel examination of political alignment at the transnational level. Focusing on the EU’s agricultural and regional budgets, I leverage the difference in turnover timing between Commissioners and heads of government to test whether political distance affects fund allocation from 1979 to 2006. Results show that greater ideological distance significantly deters fund channeling, with effects strongest in pre-election years, for countries providing portfolio Commissioners, and for single-party ruled countries. These findings suggest European Commissioners’ behavior follows principles similar to nationally elected leaders, highlighting the existing political dynamics within the EU’s executive body and their relevance to debates on EU integration and the Commission’s political independence.

Keywords: European Union, Budgets, Federalism, Partisan alignment

JEL Classification: D72, F55, H61, H77