The Political Economy of Mixed Public and Private Schooling: A Dynamic Analysis

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 1996

Posted: 11 May 1998

See all articles by Mark Gradstein

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Moshe Justman

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy of education, acquired through a combination of compulsory public schooling and supplementary private education, in the context of an OLG model in which growth is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The level of public schooling, fully funded by a proportional income tax, is determined by majority vote, while supplementary private education is purchased individually. We show existence of a political-economic equilibrium and examine its characteristics, describing the evolution of the public-private mix over time: for moderate parameter values the share of public schooling increases as incomes rise and inequality falls.

JEL Classification: I2

Suggested Citation

Gradstein, Mark and Justman, Moshe, The Political Economy of Mixed Public and Private Schooling: A Dynamic Analysis. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 1996, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4050

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+97 2 8647 2288 (Phone)
+97 2 8647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

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United States

Moshe Justman (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 864 72292 (Phone)
+972 864 72941 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

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