Complexity-Minded Antitrust

Journal of Evolutionary Economics (2023)

30 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2022 Last revised: 17 Mar 2023

See all articles by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Thibault Schrepel

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Stanford University's Codex Center; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po)

Date Written: July 29, 2022

Abstract

Complexity science permeates the policy spectrum but not antitrust. This is unfortunate. Complexity science provides a high-resolution screen on the empirical realities of markets. And it enables a rich understanding of competition, beyond the reductionist descriptions of markets and firms proposed by neoclassical models and their contemporary neo-Brandeisian critique. New insights arise from the key teachings of complexity science, like feedback loops and the role of uncertainty. The present article lays down the building blocks of a complexity-minded antitrust method.

Keywords: Complexity theory, antitrust, evolutionary economics, feedback loop, uncertainty, nonlinearity, neoclassical economics

JEL Classification: K21, K20, K00, L12, L10, L13, L22, L40, L41, L44, L43, L50, L51, B40, D11, D42

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas and Schrepel, Thibault, Complexity-Minded Antitrust (July 29, 2022). Journal of Evolutionary Economics (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4050536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4050536

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

Thibault Schrepel (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Stanford University's Codex Center ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

France

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

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