Board Connections, Firm Profitability, and Product Market Actions

99 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2022 Last revised: 8 Feb 2024

See all articles by Radhakrishnan Gopalan

Radhakrishnan Gopalan

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Renping Li

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Alminas Zaldokas

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Finance; National University of Singapore (NUS) - Sustainable & Green Finance Institute (SGFIN); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 12, 2022

Abstract

A firm’s gross margin increases by 0.8 p.p. after forming a new direct board connection to a product market peer. Gross margin also rises by 0.4 p.p. after a connection is formed to a peer indirectly through a third intermediate firm. Further, using barcode-level data of 2.7 million products, we show that new board connections are related to higher consumer good prices, a greater tendency for market allocation, and slower new product introductions. The effects are stronger when the newly connected peers share corporate customers or have similar business descriptions and hold when controlling for other inter-firm relationships.

Keywords: board of directors, interlocking directorships, product market coordination, antitrust

JEL Classification: G34, G38, L22

Suggested Citation

Gopalan, Radhakrishnan and Li, Renping and Zaldokas, Alminas, Board Connections, Firm Profitability, and Product Market Actions (April 12, 2022). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 996/2024 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4053853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4053853

Radhakrishnan Gopalan

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Renping Li (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Alminas Zaldokas

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Finance ( email )

Clear Water Bay, Kowloon
Hong Kong

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Sustainable & Green Finance Institute (SGFIN) ( email )

Singapore

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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