Systemically Important Technology

63 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2022 Last revised: 24 Jul 2024

See all articles by Kevin Werbach

Kevin Werbach

University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Legal Studies & Business Ethics Department

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

Date Written: February 1, 2022

Abstract

The debate about how to address dangers in the increasingly important technology sector misses an essential dimension. It is the same oversight that financial regulators committed prior to the Global Financial Crisis: under-appreciating systemic risk. Fortunately, the responses those regulators eventually developed provide a template to avoid a similar disaster in tech.

The financial regulation paradigm for systemically important institutions can usefully be applied our current technological environment in a way that could promote stability and resilience. In particular, we propose two steps. First, technology regulators should designate firms of systemic importance, using a set of factors modeled on those established under Dodd-Frank for financial institutions. Second, we propose that technology regulators join a council that meets regularly to discuss and identify issues of systemic risk in technology, along the lines of the Financial Stability Oversight Council.

Our proposal offers a number of advantages over the current system. It consolidates a balkanized regulatory landscape and rationalizes a regulatory mission. It offers a different perspective on technology regulation, one that addresses real problems that have—so far—bedeviled both important technology firms and their government minders. It takes the best features of a successful resilience regime and adapts them to a critical part of the economy, in a way that should appeal across the political spectrum.

Keywords: systemic risk, financial stability, Big Tech

Suggested Citation

Werbach, Kevin and Zaring, David T., Systemically Important Technology (February 1, 2022). 101 Texas L. Rev. 811 (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4053890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4053890

Kevin Werbach (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Legal Studies & Business Ethics Department ( email )

3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-1222 (Phone)

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )

3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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