Debt as Corporate Governance

48 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2022 Last revised: 27 May 2022

See all articles by Tomer Stein

Tomer Stein

Stetson University College of Law

Date Written: March 10, 2022

Abstract

Corporate law is dominated by an equity-only view of corporate governance that centers on management-shareholder dynamics. This Article expands the management-shareholder paradigm by developing a novel integrated theory of corporate governance that fully accounts for the firm’s debt. To that end, the Article carries out a comprehensive analysis of the debtholders’ influence on how the firm runs its affairs. This analysis reveals that debt does not merely function as a discipliner. Rather, it forms an integral part of the ownership and governance structure of the firm through the covenants that debtholders routinely contract for. These covenants create poison pills and other change-of-control and board restrictions, as well as restrictions on debt incurrence, asset transfers, and cash transfers such as dividends. Armed with these covenants, and the default and refinancing costs they impose on the firm, the debtholders control the firm’s operations and management along several dimensions.

In tune with this reality, the Article develops the theoretical underpinnings of debt as corporate governance and then moves on to map the standard debt covenants and their effect on the firm. Building on this integrated account, the Article updates the narrow equity-only view of the firm and demonstrates that perceiving corporate debt mechanisms as a governance system advances our understanding of pressing issues such as corporate social responsibility, interstate and federal corporate law competitions, and the roles of institutional investors.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Law, Debt

Suggested Citation

Stein, Tomer, Debt as Corporate Governance (March 10, 2022). 73 Hastings Law Journal (2023 Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4054898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4054898

Tomer Stein (Contact Author)

Stetson University College of Law ( email )

1401 61st Street South
Gulfport, FL 33707
United States
203-747-1191 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.linkedin.com/in/tomer-stein-32b12762/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
250
Abstract Views
774
Rank
185,502
PlumX Metrics