Political Uncertainty and the Forms of State Capture

62 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2022

See all articles by Leonard Wantchekon

Leonard Wantchekon

Princeton University

Nathan Canen

University of Houston

Rafael Ch

Princeton University


ABSTRACT. This paper studies when and why firms prefer more direct forms of state capture (i.e  using state officials) to more indirect ones (i.e., using  elected officials, to influence bureaucrats). First, we propose a principalagent model under political uncertainty. Firms can induce market distortions by making transfers to incumbents, but such incumbents may be displaced in an election. Direct capture acts as an insurance for the firm, guaranteeing that its paid for distortions are kept in place even when the incumbent loses. We then show that policies thought to decrease state capture, such as improved bureaucrat selection, can have little to no effect once substitution towards indirect control is accounted for. We test the model’s predictions using a novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers and businessmen in Benin. We find that an increase in political uncertainty is associated with an increase in direct forms of capture.

Keywords: D72, D73, D78, O17

Suggested Citation

Wantchekon, Leonard and Canen, Nathan and Ch, Rafael, Political Uncertainty and the Forms of State Capture. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4057107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4057107

Leonard Wantchekon (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Nathan Canen

University of Houston ( email )

4800 Calhoun Road
Houston, TX 77204
United States

Rafael Ch

Princeton University ( email )

United States
9173026600 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://esoc.princeton.edu/about-us/people/rafael-j-ch-duran

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