Violating International Law is Contagious

Abstract

Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies, but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is a mechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable for betrayal, but also increase their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with international law is like playing cooperate in a stag-hunt game. Playing cooperate is an efficient strategy but not a strategy that is evolutionary stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate international law, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating international law contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they break international law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.

Keywords: International Law Violations, Democratic peace, Game Theory

JEL Classification: K33, C72