Strategic Digitization in Currency and Payment Competition

85 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2022 Last revised: 4 Apr 2025

See all articles by Lin William Cong

Lin William Cong

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Simon Mayer

Carnegie Mellon University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2021

Abstract

We model the competition between digital forms of fiat money and private digital money. Countries digitize their currencies—by upgrading existing or launching new payment systems (including CBDCs)—to compete with foreign fiat currencies and private digital money. A pecking order emerges: less dominant currencies digitize earlier, reflecting a first-mover advantage; dominant currencies delay digitization until they face competition; the weakest currencies forgo digitization. However, delayed digitization allows private digital money to gain widespread adoption, eventually weakening fiat money's role. We highlight how geopolitical considerations, stablecoins, and interoperability between fiat and private digital money shape the dynamics of currency competition.

Keywords: CBDC, Cryptocurrency, Currency Competition, Digitization, Dollarization, Money, Stablecoin, Tokenomics.

JEL Classification: G10, G11, G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Cong, Lin and Mayer, Simon, Strategic Digitization in Currency and Payment Competition (December 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4063878 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4063878

Lin Cong (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.linwilliamcong.com/

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Simon Mayer

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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