Informational Obsession, Opinion Control and Freedom of Expression in Financial Regulation – Some Critical Perspectives

European Business Law Review, vol. 33, 2022 Forthcoming

21 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2022

See all articles by Regis Bismuth

Regis Bismuth

Sciences Po Law School (Ecole de Droit de Sciences Po)

Date Written: March 23, 2022

Abstract

The theoretical underpinnings of financial regulation have led to an obsessive quest for transparency. This has not only generated a gradual increase in disclosure requirements, but has also generated some other unintended consequences, such as structural conflicts of interests, which affect the modes of information (and opinion) production of influential actors. Credit rating agencies, for example, have also in their own right raised new regulatory concerns. Within this wider context, this article explores whether regulatory initiatives to stringently discipline credit rating agencies’ activities (particularly with a view to issuing sovereign ratings), or other initiatives which reflect an increasing willingness to control speech in financial markets (for instance those targeting activist shareholder strategies), are in line with relevant principles guaranteeing the freedom of expression which have seemingly remained a blind spot of financial regulators.

Keywords: Financial regulation, transparency, disclosure, information, opinion, freedom of expression, financial disintermediation, credit rating agencies, shareholder activism, financial evaluation

JEL Classification: K22, K23, K30

Suggested Citation

Bismuth, Regis, Informational Obsession, Opinion Control and Freedom of Expression in Financial Regulation – Some Critical Perspectives (March 23, 2022). European Business Law Review, vol. 33, 2022 Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4064594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064594

Regis Bismuth (Contact Author)

Sciences Po Law School (Ecole de Droit de Sciences Po) ( email )

13 rue de l'université
Paris, 75007
France

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