Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection

50 Pages Posted: 13 May 2003

See all articles by Narjess Boubakri

Narjess Boubakri

American University of Sharjah - School of Business and Management; HEC Montreal - Department of Finance

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business

Jean-Claude Cosset

HEC Montreal

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Privatization, Performance

JEL Classification: G32, G38

Suggested Citation

Boubakri, Narjess and Guedhami, Omrane and Cosset, Jean-Claude, Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 37.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=406461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.406461

Narjess Boubakri (Contact Author)

American University of Sharjah - School of Business and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 26666
Sharjah
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://www.aus.edu

HEC Montreal - Department of Finance ( email )

3000 Chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )

Columbia, SC
United States

Jean-Claude Cosset

HEC Montreal ( email )

3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada
514-340-6872 (Phone)
514-340-6987 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,425
rank
11,662
Abstract Views
14,514
PlumX Metrics