Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control: The Case of FIFA

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations

Posted: 28 Mar 2022

See all articles by William R. Heaston

William R. Heaston

University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School

Matthew C. Mitchell

Drake University

Jeffrey A. Kappen

Drake University

Date Written: August 31, 2020

Abstract

This article applies and expands on a typology of organizational corruption control
to analyze the various mechanisms used to address corruption within the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It uses case study evidence in tandem
with insights from neo-institutional theory to construct a conceptual framework in
which corruption control types are more completely examined within their broader
institutional context. Using this framework, the article shows how the persistence of
corruption in FIFA and its checkered reform process are attributable to an organizational
filtering phenomenon that has limited the operation of internal and external
corruption controls. Finally, it discusses some implications of this framework for
transnational organizational governance reform.

Keywords: Organizational corruption, anti-corruption, neo-institutional theory, FIFA

Suggested Citation

Heaston, William R. and Mitchell, Matthew C. and Kappen, Jeffrey A., Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control: The Case of FIFA (August 31, 2020). Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4066635

William R. Heaston (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Matthew C. Mitchell

Drake University

2507 University Ave.
Des Moines, IA 50311
United States

Jeffrey A. Kappen

Drake University

2507 University Ave.
Des Moines, IA 50311
United States

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