Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance

43 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2022 Last revised: 10 May 2022

Date Written: March 28, 2022

Abstract

In the public sector, using incentives as a motivational tool is more constrained than in the private sector, and a lack of promotion incentives may dampen morale, performance, and talent retention. I study how bureaucrats' on-the-job performance and career decisions respond to changes in promotion incentives. I use a unique setting in the Chicago Police Department (CPD), where strict eligibility criteria in the promotion opportunities suddenly reduced the promotion chances of some officers relative to an otherwise similar group of officers. The deterioration of promotion outlook actually induced the ineligible officers to sharply raise arrest performance by 30% as they pursued an alternative career path in high-productivity tactical teams that provided intrinsic rewards. In a large frontline bureaucracy, intrinsic career incentives are a powerful determinant of organizational performance and can compensate for inadequate external incentives.

Keywords: promotion, performance, career incentives, public sector, police, personnel

JEL Classification: H40, J30, K40, M50

Suggested Citation

Kim, Taeho, Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance (March 28, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4067898

Taeho Kim (Contact Author)

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada

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