Preferences for Reforms: Endowments vs. Beliefs

50 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2022

See all articles by Romain Duval

Romain Duval

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Yi Ji

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Chris Papageorgiou

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Ippei Shibata

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Antonio Spilimbergo

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2022

Abstract

Are preferences for reforms driven by individuals' own endowments or beliefs? To address this question, we conducted a cross-country survey on people's opinions on employment protection legislation-an area where reform has proven to be difficult and personal interests are at stake. We find that individuals' beliefs matter more than their own endowments and personal pay-offs. A randomized information treatment confirms that beliefs explain views about reform, but beliefs can change with new information. Our results are robust to several robustness tests, including to alternative estimation techniques and samples.

Keywords: beliefs, employment protection, Ideology, political economy, political opinions, preferences, Regulation, Surveys

JEL Classification: D70, D72, J08, J65

Suggested Citation

Duval, Romain and Ji, Yi and Papageorgiou, Chris and Shibata, Ippei and Spilimbergo, Antonio, Preferences for Reforms: Endowments vs. Beliefs (March 2022). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17088, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4069896

Romain Duval (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Yi Ji

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Chris Papageorgiou

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Ippei Shibata

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Antonio Spilimbergo

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-6346 (Phone)
202-623-6336 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute ( email )

724 E. University Ave.
Wyly Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States

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