A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation
Posted: 5 May 1998
There are 2 versions of this paper
A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation
Simon School of Business Working Paper MP 95-01
Posted: 05 May 1998
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A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 1999
Posted: 19 Jan 1999
Date Written: Undated
Abstract
We construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay-as- you-go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium. We analyze the welfare implications of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measures to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness.
JEL Classification: H55
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cooley, Thomas F. and Soares, Jorge, A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation (Undated). Simon School of Business Working Paper MP 95-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4071
Thomas F. Cooley (Contact Author)
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
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