Evolving Approaches to Systemic Risk Regulation in Insurance

Forthcoming, Research Handbook on International Insurance Law & Regulation (2nd edition) (Julian Burling & Kevin Lazarus, eds., 2022)

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 582

26 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2022 Last revised: 13 Apr 2022

See all articles by Jeremy C. Kress

Jeremy C. Kress

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Patricia A. McCoy

Boston College Law School

Daniel Schwarcz

University of Minnesota Law School

Date Written: March 31, 2022

Abstract

After the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers developed two different approaches to systemic risk arising from insurance conglomerates and other nonbank financial firms. The first, dubbed an entity-based approach, empowers a public entity like the Financial Stability Board or Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate individual nonbank systemically important financial institutions for enhanced regulation and supervision. The second, known as an activities-based approach, seeks to regulate financial activities that can produce systemic risk. Updating the authors' previous work on nonbank systemic risk, this book chapter evaluates how policymakers' approaches to systemic risk regulation in insurance have evolved since the crisis. It tracks how international standard-setting organizations and U.S. regulators initially relied on the entity-based approach, using discretionary methodologies for identifying specific nonbank firms, including insurers, that were systemically significant. It then shows how, in response to backlash, international and U.S. policymakers abruptly ceased entity-based designations and purported to shift their focus to an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk.

This chapter contends, however, that rumors of the demise of entity-based systemic risk regulation are premature. Instead, prevailing regulatory strategies for nonbank systemic risk retain strong elements of an entity-based approach, particularly in the insurance sector. The key change is that insurers subject to enhanced systemic risk regulation are no longer chosen using complex, multi-factor tests that require regulators to exercise significant discretion. Instead, regulators rely on more formulaic rules to identify insurers that could pose systemic risks and, at least in theory, regulate them accordingly. These developments demonstrate that an entity-based approach is an indispensable component of effective nonbank systemic risk regulation. Policymakers’ continued emphasis on entity-based strategies is sensible because effective systemic risk oversight requires consolidated regulation that focuses on the cumulative impact of a financial conglomerate’s activities. Activities-based approaches, meanwhile, are often difficult to implement outside of an entity-oriented regime. Thus, the much-heralded shift to activities-based systemic risk regulation in the insurance sector may prove in the long run to be mostly rhetorical. Entity-based systemic risk regulation in the insurance sector is here to stay. The principal remaining question is whether it will be designed and implemented effectively.

Keywords: Insurance, Systemic Risk, Financial Stability, Financial Stability Board, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Nonbank Financial Companies, Entity-Based Regulation, Activities-Based Regulation

Suggested Citation

Kress, Jeremy C. and McCoy, Patricia Ann and Schwarcz, Daniel, Evolving Approaches to Systemic Risk Regulation in Insurance (March 31, 2022). Forthcoming, Research Handbook on International Insurance Law & Regulation (2nd edition) (Julian Burling & Kevin Lazarus, eds., 2022), Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 582, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4072025 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4072025

Jeremy C. Kress (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

Patricia Ann McCoy

Boston College Law School ( email )

885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States

Daniel Schwarcz

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.umn.edu/profiles/daniel-schwarcz

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