The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs): a first empirical glimpse

Venture Capital

25 Pages Posted: 11 May 2022 Last revised: 12 Sep 2022

See all articles by Cristiano Bellavitis

Cristiano Bellavitis

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management

Christian Fisch

University of Luxembourg - Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT)

Paul P. Momtaz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management; University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: June 7, 2022

Abstract

Blockchain technology and smart contracts are catalysts for decentralization and disintermediation. These new technologies reduce transaction costs, agency costs, and offer a basis for trustless social and economic interactions. They are fueling new business models for decentralized platforms and have revolutionized crowdfunding. A recent trend, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), stands to fundamentally transform organizing and governance. DAOs are blockchain-native, decentralized organizations that are collectively owned and managed by their members via smart contracts. In this note, we assess the promises and challenges of DAOs, with a focus on decentralized governance and disintermediation, and offer a first empirical glimpse at the rise and functioning of DAOs. Overall, DAOs may introduce a new era in organizational economics, transforming the global corporate landscape from hierarchical organizations to democratic and distributed organizations powered by organizational entrepreneurship and innovations.

Keywords: DAO, Decentralized Autonomous Organization, Blockchain, Ethereum.

Suggested Citation

Bellavitis, Cristiano and Fisch, Christian and Momtaz, Paul P., The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs): a first empirical glimpse (June 7, 2022). Venture Capital, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4074833 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4074833

Cristiano Bellavitis

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management ( email )

721 University Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States

Christian Fisch (Contact Author)

University of Luxembourg - Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) ( email )

JFK Building
29, Avenue J.F Kennedy
Luxembourg, L-1885
Luxembourg

Paul P. Momtaz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies ( email )

UCL CBT UCL Computer Science
Malet Place London WC
London, London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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