How Does Redistricting Matter? Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Setting in Mexico

81 Pages Posted: 2 May 2022

See all articles by Alejandro Trelles

Alejandro Trelles

Brandeis University

Micah Altman

Center for Research in Equitable and Open Scholarship, MIT

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Michael P. McDonald

University of Florida; George Mason University - Government and Politics

Date Written: April 5, 2022

Abstract

Redistricting affects directly the translation of votes to seats, and is therefore one of the most politicized procedures within electoral management. Mexico’s approach is unique – since 1996 an independent board has been creating plans algorithmically. Parties, however, are able to formulate hundreds of counter-proposals in a closed-door environment. We ask: Why and when do political parties engage in the process, and what is the political consequence of their participation? To address these questions, we analyze a unique data set comprising all the submitted partisan map proposals during the 2013 and 2017 redistricting rounds. Our analysis reveals parties’ plans have surprisingly marginal partisan effects. We find a combination of redistricting criteria, demographic shifts, and voting preferences – rather than partisan gerrymandering – account for the stability of electoral outcomes.

Keywords: electoral management, redistricting, party strategic interaction, algorithmic optimization, gerrymandering.

Suggested Citation

Trelles, Alejandro and Altman, Micah and Magar, Eric and McDonald, Michael P. and McDonald, Michael P., How Does Redistricting Matter? Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Setting in Mexico (April 5, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4076322 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4076322

Alejandro Trelles (Contact Author)

Brandeis University ( email )

415 South Street
Politics Department, MS 058, Brandeis University
Waltham, MA MA 01742
United States
7817365336 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.alejandrotrelles.com/

Micah Altman

Center for Research in Equitable and Open Scholarship, MIT ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://micahaltman.com

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Michael P. McDonald

George Mason University - Government and Politics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

University of Florida ( email )

PO Box 117165, 201 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32610-0496
United States

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